What Is Wrong With Agnostic Belief? by Avnur, Yuval
2
What is Wrong with Agnostic Belief?
Yuval Avnur
What makes an agnostic neither a theist nor an atheist? This is
sometimes taken to be a matter of belief about some relevant religious
hypothesis; call it ‘h’. A theist believes that h is true, while an atheist
believes that h is false. On this way of carving up the territory, an
agnostic is a non-believer; an agnostic lacks belief that h and lacks
belief that not-h. Non-belief is in turn sometimes understood as a
‘suspense of judgement’, though that notion has proved difficult to
analyse.1
There is another way to understand agnosticism. From a philo-
sophical, or at least an epistemological perspective, we are interested
in evidence and arguments for beliefs, not just beliefs themselves.
Though theism is a metaphysical position, that h (e.g. that there is a
God), a theist thinker presumably also thinks that the evidence (or
arguments, which I count as a sort of evidence) ultimately indicates
that h is true. And an atheist thinker presumably thinks that evidence
ultimately indicates that h is false. Accordingly, an agnostic thinker
should hold that evidence doesn’t ultimately or sufficiently indicate
either way about h. There are various ways for evidence to fail to
ultimately indicate something, and below I will focus on a particular
one. But even prior to that disambiguation, the distinction between
1 See Monton (1998) and Friedman (2013) for critical discussion of some attempts
to formalize an agnostic attitude. I briefly discuss Friedman’s positive proposal at the
end of this chapter.
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agnosticism and the first two positions with respect to evidence about
h should be clear. So far I have left out a sort of fideism, or the attitude
of believing that h while also believing that the evidence fails to
ultimately indicate whether h is true. My main question concerns
this sort of position.
A couple of preliminary remarks about agnosticism as a position
about evidence will be helpful, since agnosticism is so often assumed
to be simply a matter of withholding belief. First, construing agnos-
ticism as having this epistemological component is certainly consist-
ent with the way in which the term was originally introduced:
T.H. Huxley2 introduced the term in the nineteenth century by
describing agnostics as ones who ‘like [himself], confess themselves
to be hopelessly ignorant concerning a variety of matters, about
which metaphysicians and theologians, both orthodox and hetero-
dox, dogmatise with the utmost confidence’. Regarding oneself as
‘hopelessly ignorant’ with respect to h involves, at least, thinking
that the evidence does not (perhaps could not, since the situation is
‘hopeless’) settle whether h.
Second, lack of belief about h can be due to things like an abun-
dance of caution, stubbornness, failure to even consider evidence, or
one’s regarding h as so fantastic, or so desirable, that one hesitates to
trust what seems to one to be even a fairly solid case in favour of h.
Surely, these ways of lacking belief about h are not the only ways to be
agnostic. There is also a more principled, philosophical sort of agnos-
ticism. Taking a philosophically agnostic position is not merely a
matter of lacking belief for any reason; it involves lacking belief about
h because, roughly, one thinks that it is unknowable whether h.3 When
this epistemological, sceptical position is fleshed out in more detail (in
section I), its worthiness of the title ‘agnosticism’ should become
clearer.
I have specified two sorts of agnosticism: non-belief (or suspense of
judgement) about h, and belief about the insufficiency of our evidence
about h. I do not aim to adjudicate which of the two (if either) should
count as the most correct way of understanding agnosticism. Instead,
2 Huxley (1884).
3 For a different approach, see Schellenberg (2009) and (2013), pp. 100–106, where
a notion of ‘imaginative faith’ is developed in the place of what I am calling ‘agnos-
ticism’.
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my aim is to consider a key question about the relation between the
two. Does the position that the evidence supports neither h nor not-h
commit one to non-belief about h? It may well seem perverse to go to
the trouble to develop a negative view of a belief ’s epistemic creden-
tials, and then to hold the belief anyway—and this seems equally
perverse whether we have in mind belief in theism or belief in
atheism. But what, exactly, is wrong with believing something that
you are agnostic about in the second, epistemological sense? What is
wrong with believing h (or not-h) while also believing that there can
be no evidence about h? That will be my main question, and I will call
belief in a proposition that one is also epistemologically agnostic
about ‘agnostic belief ’.
I begin in section I by clarifying the sort of agnosticism I have in
mind, namely the second, epistemological version. In sections II and
III, I explain and, to some extent, defend two assumptions that
facilitate answering the main question, ‘What is wrong with agnostic
belief?’. I then consider what I take to be the three main answers: such
a belief would be unjustified for lack of evidence (section IV); one’s set
of attitudes would in this case be problematically akratic or incoher-
ent (section V); and one would be committed to a judgement—a so-
called ‘Moore-paradoxical’ judgement—the absurdity of which
reveals the irrationality of being an agnostic believer (section VI).
After arguing against each of those answers, I consider, in section VII,
some other features of defensible agnostic belief.
Before proceeding, a clarification about the main question is in
order. There are different senses in which a state or attitude can be
wrong. I will consider what is ‘wrong’ with agnostic belief exclusively
from an epistemic perspective. This means that when we attempt to
explain what is wrong with agnostic belief, we are attempting to
understand a deficiency in the belief ’s, or in the believer’s, accuracy
with respect to the truth, from the subject’s perspective. The relevant
aspect of the subject’s perspective is to be understood in terms of her
evidence. So the question, clarified, is: What is wrong with agnostic
belief, from an epistemic perspective, which is one that is concerned
with accuracy relative to the evidence? In pursuing the question in
this way, I will assume that a belief ’s or a believer’s ‘rationality’ is a
measure of that belief ’s or that believer’s accuracy relative to the
believer’s evidence. Accordingly, the answers to the question that
I will consider all take the following form: What is wrong with
agnostic belief is that it is always (epistemically) irrational.
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I . SECOND-ORDER AGNOSTICISM
Recall that an agnostic stance on some hypothesis, h, is supposed to
be contrary to both the stance that h is true and the stance that h is
false.4 But the sort of agnosticism I will develop here is not defined as
a failure to take a position on h’s truth. Rather it is a position with
respect to taking a position on h’s truth. This second-order attitude is
explained in general terms in this section. Though there are differing
candidate attitudes that might constitute some other, neutral stance
deserving of the name ‘agnosticism’, here I focus on one, second-
order way of being an agnostic. I will briefly mention some others, at
the end of this section, for contrast.
Suppose that you believe that you have absolutely no evidence that
bears on a hypothesis, so that you do not even know what probability
to assign it. When you have this belief, you are not merely ignorant,
since you believe that you are ignorant in the relevant respect (we
surely are unwittingly ignorant about many things that we have never
even considered). This belief does not yet constitute the agnosticism
I want to focus on, but it is a start. Agnosticism has something to do
with believing that you, perhaps that we all, are ignorant about
something. To get from believing in your ignorance about something
to the sort of agnosticism I want to discuss requires specifying the sort
of ignorance one believes in. Roughly, the agnosticism I have in mind
consists in the belief that no foreseeable source of evidence could bear
on h sufficiently to justify belief about h. However, some further
clarifications are needed, and this agnosticism needs to be further
narrowed down.
First, you must believe that your total evidence is insufficient. This
means you lack background (inductive or statistical) evidence about
the hypothesis. For example, to borrow Russell’s famous orbiting
teapot example,5 you may lack direct evidence that there is a teapot
orbiting the Earth, and yet possess some background evidence about
what teapots are, where they come from, what it takes to launch
something into orbit, whether astronauts take teapots with them
and dispose of them while in orbit, and so on. This was not the
4 Rosenkranz (2007) focuses on agnosticism as a stance concerning our knowledge,
whereas I will primarily be discussing justification. Otherwise, the sort of agnosticism
I will focus on here is similar to the sort he discusses.
5 Russell (1952).
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point Russell was trying to make with this example. In fact, he seemed
not to recognize how our background evidence bears on the hypoth-
esis. But it can be used to illustrate the importance of distinguishing
total from direct evidence. The orbiting teapot would presumably not
be a case in which you are an agnostic in the present sense, since you
think that your evidence—though perhaps not direct or observational
evidence—bears significantly on the hypothesis. We think we have
sufficient evidence to show that it is extremely unlikely that there is
such a teapot; we are atheists about orbiting teapots.6
Another way for background evidence to bear on a hypothesis,
when one lacks direct evidence about it, is for one’s understanding of
the case to partition the possibilities in such a way as to determine a
probability. For example, consider the hypothesis that the next time
you roll a fair die ten times, it will land ‘6’ each of those ten times. You
understand what it is for a die to be fair, and so you ‘see’ that this
hypothesis is very unlikely to be true. We may wish to count this as
evidence against the hypothesis. Regardless of whether we count it as
evidence against the hypothesis, this is a case in which, though we
lack direct evidence about the hypothesis (since the rolling of the die
has not yet occurred and is stipulated to be fair), we should presum-
ably not be agnostics about it, at least not in the sense that I will be
discussing. Instead, we should be fairly confident that it is false, and
we should believe that this confidence is justified. Again, we lack
direct evidence, but we are atheists.7
So far, I have specified that an agnostic believes that her total
evidence—including her understanding of the case—fails to justify
belief, or some other significant level of confidence about the hypoth-
esis. But furthermore, an agnostic also believes that none of her
current or foreseeable sources of evidence could produce such evi-
dence about the hypothesis. For example, I currently have no evi-
dence about whether space suits of the sort that astronauts wear at the
6 Similarly, if you are agnostic, then you think that the fact that you lack direct
evidence about the hypothesis does not itself confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis,
since you would not expect to have any evidence about the hypothesis whatever its
truth-value is. I lack space to discuss such cases here. See Sober (2009a) and Avnur
(forthcoming).
7 I have avoided bringing up the principle of indifference in this discussion. That
principle will not be relevant to the cases I end up discussing below, and so will not
help to determine a probability for the hypotheses about which I suggest we should be
agnostic.
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space station are comfortable when worn in orbit. I’ve never read
about this, never interviewed an astronaut, and I’ve never been in
such a suit at the station myself. But I know that I could, in principle,
find out: maybe there is or will soon be some existing literature on it,
maybe I could interview a current or past astronaut, and maybe
I could get hold of a suit and join some future expedition to the
space station. This is not something that is likely to happen. But it is
something that my sources of evidence could, in a foreseeable (though
unlikely) way bear on. So I should not be agnostic about this, at least
not in the sense that I will be discussing. This seems an acceptable
interpretation of agnosticism. For, presumably, a philosophical
agnostic about a religious hypothesis does not typically think that if
we just tried harder, or investigated further, or called the right person,
we would find evidence about it. At any rate, at least one recognizable
sort of agnostic thinks that, in principle, we do not have access to
good evidence about h, and this is the position I have in mind. In
section III, below, I suggest that we are sometimes justified in such a
stance with respect to some religious hypotheses.
As I noted above, the belief that constitutes this kind of agnosticism
has a second-order character. It is about what your evidence cannot
justify, or about your epistemic situation with respect to the relevant
hypothesis. Thus, I call it ‘second-order agnosticism’. Specifically,
second-order agnosticism about some hypothesis is the belief that
no (first-order) doxastic attitude about the hypothesis can be justified
by the evidence (as described by the specifications above).
I understand doxastic attitudes to include at least belief and disbelief
(i.e. belief not-), as well as degrees of confidence about the relevant
hypothesis. The ‘can’ is meant to signify that this applies to what your
current and foreseeable sources of evidence could supply (it is not
meant to imply that it is a necessary fact that you will always lack
evidence from any possible source). I will discuss one important
implication of the possibility of there, someday, somehow, being
evidence in the last section, section VII. But for the most part it will
not matter for my main question, which concerns agnostic belief.
Finally, note that second-order agnosticism is a belief, and as such it
could turn out to be false.
Second-order agnosticism is worth distinguishing from other atti-
tudes that might be considered agnostic, but which are more direct or
first-order. Clearly it is distinct from any first-order attitude since it is
a second-order attitude, but, further, first-order agnosticism does not
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necessarily commit one to second-order agnosticism. There are
hypotheses and evidential situations such that some first-order type
of agnosticism may be appropriate while second-order agnosticism is
not (and vice versa). Here are a few instances of this.
First, simply having no attitude about h might be interpreted as
agnosticism about h. But we have this (non-)attitude about hypoth-
eses which we have never even considered, and clearly we do not and
should not believe second-order agnosticism about hypotheses we
have never even considered.
Second, having a .5, or middling, degree of confidence in a hypoth-
esis might be thought to be a sort of agnosticism about it. But one
might have this attitude on the basis of evidence that is equally
weighted for and against the hypothesis. If so, then second-order
agnosticism would not be appropriate, since evidence could bear on
the hypothesis. That is, one’s sources of evidence are such that they
could produce evidence sufficient for justified belief (say, in the
absence of the other, competing evidence that one actually happens
to have).
Third, one might think that considering, and then withholding,
belief about a hypothesis constitutes a type of agnosticism. But one
could be in this state without properly being a second-order agnostic.
For example, one might withhold belief while the investigation is
ongoing, while one is considering the weight of various items of
evidence, or watching the evidence come in. In such a case, of course
one may well believe that one’s sources (or foreseeable sources) could
sufficiently bear on the hypothesis, so one is not a second-order
agnostic.
So far, I have suggested that the having of various first-order
‘agnostic’ attitudes towards a hypothesis does not commit one to
second-order agnosticism. My main question now concerns being a
second-order agnostic while not withholding belief in the relevant
hypothesis. That is, is it necessarily irrational to be a second-order
agnostic about h while having a belief or confidence one way or
another about h? I am calling this combination of attitudes—second-
order agnosticism about a hypothesis and belief or confidence about
that hypothesis—agnostic belief.
Before considering the question, though, two assumptions must be
made, explained, and defended. In section II, I consider whether agnos-
tic belief is even possible. In section III, I consider whether second-order
agnosticism itself can ever be justified, with respect to some religious
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hypotheses. After that, in sections IVVI, I will consider whether
agnostic belief is always irrational.
II . FIRST ASSUMPTION: AGNOSTIC
BELIEF IS POSSIBLE
In considering the rationality of agnostic belief, I will assume that
agnostic belief is logically, conceptually, and psychologically possible.
I think that these assumptions are plausible but I will not have space
to argue thoroughly for that. Instead, I will just make the assumptions
explicit and gesture towards their motivation. After this, I will also
suggest that these assumptions may not really be necessary, though
they are useful.
I assume that agnostic belief is logically possible. This seems a safe
assumption because there is no formal contradiction in attributing to
some subject both second-order agnosticism and belief: the belief that
constitutes second-order agnosticism about h is distinct from belief
that h, by definition. Furthermore, the truth of second-order agnos-
ticism about h is compatible with both the truth and the falsity of h.
So there seems to be no reason to hold that it is logically impossible
for someone to hold an agnostic belief.
I assume that agnostic belief is conceptually possible in the sense
that the concept of belief does not rule out agnostic belief. Some hold
that, in order to be a belief, an attitude must be susceptible to change
due to new evidence.8 But this account of belief does not make
agnostic belief impossible. For, it does not follow, from one’s being
a second-order agnostic about h, that one’s attitude towards h is not
susceptible to evidence, even by one’s own lights. For instance, if
some unforeseeable source of evidence were to arise, the agnostic
believer’s belief that h might change, and she would no longer be a
second-order agnostic about h. For example, if an agnostic believer
learns that her second-order agnosticism is mistaken, and, say, there
is actually evidence against the hypothesis, she could (presumably
would) drop her belief that h. And, to take another example, even if
8 For example, Gendler (2008) contrasts belief in this way with what she calls
‘alief ’, and Van Leeuwen (2014) contrasts belief in this way with what he calls
‘religious credence’.
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one’s second-order agnostic belief about h is true, and no current or
foreseeable source of evidence can bear on h, it may still be true that,
supposing that one were to get evidence (as is impossible in this case),
one would change one’s attitude about h. The disposition to be
sensitive to evidence might be there even in the absence of any
possible evidence. The agnostic belief is, in that case, much like a
fragile glass in a world filled with pillows.9
Granting that agnostic belief is logically and conceptually possible,
there is still the question whether it is (humanly) psychologically
possible. That it is psychologically possible is really the main assump-
tion, since this possibility entails that agnostic belief is both logically
and conceptually possible. It is not only the strongest assumption, but
also the most complex and contentious. I will discuss this assumption
in more detail, below, when discussing akrasia. For now, I will simply
assume that agnostic belief is psychologically possible and point out a
few things about it.
First, notice that second-order agnosticism is about what can be
justified by the evidence. So, anyone who thinks that, eventually, we
must believe something without evidence because evidence must
come to an end, must hold that agnostic belief is psychologically
possible. Some popular forms of foundationalism seem committed
to this view:10 they think that it is possible to believe something when
one also believes that there is no evidence for it. Similarly, those who
think it is possible (though perhaps irrational) to believe something
on blind faith already think it is possible to be an agnostic believer.
Less obviously, one might think that cases of self-deception, in which
a person believes that evidence does not justify some belief and yet
still holds that latter belief, provide a third type of psychologically
real case.
Second, agnostic belief has been assumed to be psychologically
possible throughout much of the history of philosophy, at least by
some prominent philosophers. On one interpretation, Kant’s ‘prac-
tical postulates’ are beliefs (or, at least, commitments) one could have
9 See Ribeiro (2011) for discussion, historical overview, and rejection of the view
that akratic beliefs are impossible.
10 Wright (2004) and White (2006) have defended this sort of view in the context
of scepticism about the external world. Ribeiro (2011) holds that agnostic belief is
actual in the same context, but without committing to foundationalism. Others, such
as Plantinga (2000), have rejected evidentialism, and are also committed to the
psychological possibility of agnostic belief, in the context of religious belief.
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while recognizing that reason does not support them.11 Similarly,
Hume seems to have held both that some beliefs cannot be supported
by any reason or evidence and that having such beliefs is naturally
unavoidable. Sextus arguably also held that we must assent to things
without holding that there is any (unopposed) evidence for them. So
this assumption is in some good company.
Finally, note that, even if the assumption is wrong, and we are not
able, psychologically, to hold agnostic beliefs, we may still ask an
abstract, ideal, normative question about it. That is, we could still ask
whether, were it possible to have such a combination of attitudes, that
would be rational. This would not be an unprecedented sort of
question, and it can still be an important one in this case. It is not
unprecedented because, for one example, Bayesian or ‘formal’
approaches to epistemology idealize beyond what is psychologically
possible. It is held, for example, that being logically omniscient is
rationally ideal, despite the fact that this is psychologically impos-
sible.12 It is still interesting to consider the rational status of agnostic
belief, even if it turns out to be psychologically impossible, because
that would shed light on the status of our actual state when we are
second-order agnostics about something. That is, the status of agnos-
tic belief can help to determine what we take the status of agnostic
non-belief to be. It may, for example, turn out to be epistemically no
better than agnostic belief, even if agnostic belief is psychologically
impossible.
III . SECOND ASSUMPTION: SECOND-ORDER
AGNOSTICISM CAN BE JUSTIFIED
So far, I have assumed that agnostic belief is possible. I will also assume
that there are situations in which it is rational, or justified, to be a
second-order agnostic in the first place. This is a helpful assumption
because such circumstances, in which second-order agnosticism is
justified, will presumably place some constraints on one’s first-order
attitude about the hypothesis in question. Furthermore, it is worth
11 See Chignell (2007).
12 See Christensen (2004) for some discussion of this.
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considering cases in which second-order agnosticism is justified in
order to further motivate our question about agnostic belief. After all,
who cares if it is rational to believe something that one is second-order
agnostic about if it is never rational to be second-order agnostic about
anything? Finally, note that it is unnecessary to argue, or even assume,
that all or even all standard religious hypotheses are such that second-
order agnosticism is sometimes justified about them. The question is
whether agnostic belief is always irrational. If it can be shown that one
significant (i.e. not overly contrived) example of justified second-order
agnosticism might in fact be non-wrongly held in conjunction with a
belief in the hypothesis, this will show that the answer is ‘no, it is not
always wrong to be an agnostic believer’. This may well shed light on
agnostic belief in general.
In discussions of religion, an obvious and classic hypothesis about
which agnosticism seems appropriate is one according to which there
is a God that is transcendent in the sense that we cannot get evidence
for it during our lives in this world. The existence of this God would
matter to us, presumably, at least in part because it would make some
sense of our existence, and perhaps hold some promise of an afterlife
for us. One can even leave some room for interaction between us, the
creatures of this world, and such a God, in the form of miracles that
have happened long ago or in faraway places. Such miracles, though,
must not have the capacity to provide us with evidence for such a
God’s existence, or else belief, rather than second-order agnosticism,
will be justified by the evidence. Thus, the requisite transcendence is
epistemological rather than strictly metaphysical; we should think of
this sort of hypothesis as one according to which an epistemically
transcendent God exists. This seems, by definition, something about
which we are justified in being second-order agnostics.
A similar hypothesis posits some form of divinity or other, without
specifying that it is a god. We can think of this as the hypothesis that
an epistemically transcendent divinity exists. By hypothesis, we can
have no evidence either for or against it. So, it seems that second-
order agnosticism is justified.13 On such hypothesis is James’ religious
hypothesis in The Will to Believe:
13 Do explanatory considerations of simplicity and elegance tell against this
hypothesis? I think not, but I cannot defend that here. See Sober (2009b).
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the best things are the more eternal things, the overlapping things, the
things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say
the final word . . . [and] we are better off even now if we believe [this] to
be true.14
James famously held that the ‘intellect’ is silent on whether we should
believe this hypothesis, in the sense that none of our evidence could
possibly indicate whether it is true (at least independently of a belief
we may have in it). Another, similar hypothesis can be found in
Schellenberg’s work, under the titles of ‘Ultimism’—‘there is a meta-
physically and axiologically ultimate reality (one representing both
the deepest fact about the nature of things and the greatest possible
value), in relation to which an ultimate good can be attained’15—and
‘T-ism’—‘Reality is transcendent—more than or other than the arena
of mundane events or . . . anything physical or natural’.16 It is hard to
see how our current or foreseeable sources of evidence could bear on
such hypotheses. So, presumably, second-order agnosticism about
such hypotheses could be justified.
One might want to argue that second-order agnosticism is also
justified with respect to more traditional theistic hypotheses. And
there may also be secular hypotheses about which second-order
agnosticism is justified.17 In assuming that some such hypotheses
are plausible targets for second-order agnosticism, I do not mean to
make any contribution to a debate about whether this is so. For
example, I will not make any attempt here to contribute to the
theological tenability of an epistemically transcendent yet personal
God.18 Rather, I mean only to give some, albeit vague, content to the
idea that there are some hypotheses about which second-order agnos-
ticism is justified. My main question concerns the status of agnostic
belief, and it will not matter, in what follows, what the content of the
belief, or the hypothesis in question, entails. What matters is that one
is justified in being a second-order agnostic about some hypothesis.
14 James (1897 [1896]). 15 Schellenberg (2005), p. 23.
16 Schellenberg (forthcoming), p. 9.
17 Examples of secular hypotheses include hypotheses about the positions of
particles so far away that no information about them is possible at this point in the
universe’s evolution, and perhaps some sceptical hypotheses about which, arguably,
we can never get any evidence.
18 See, for example, Schellenbeg’s most recent book on the problem of divine
hiddenness (2015).
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What if one insists that there is no hypothesis about which second-
order agnosticism is justified? I have two points to make about this
insistence. First, the idea that second-order agnosticism is never
justified for any hypothesis is implausible for various reasons. Here
are a few. First, setting the largely rejected logical positivist perspec-
tive aside, it is hard to imagine why one would insist that it is
impossible for something to be true while we lack evidence for it, in
principle. Second, it seems likely that there are some such hypotheses,
since accuracy per se is not strictly a constraint upon evolution; there
is no reason to think that our evolution requires accurate beliefs about
all aspects of reality, but only those that are relevant to our satisfying
the requirements of efficient reproduction. Third, there seem to be
uncontroversial examples aside from the overtly ‘religious’ ones dis-
cussed above. Consider, for example, the continuum hypothesis.
Plenty of other, widely recognized examples exist in the literature.19
The second point to make is that, if it turned out that there is no
hypothesis about which second-order agnosticism is justified, that
would be a remarkable and interesting fact. In order to appreciate
how astonishing it would be if no hypothesis were worthy of our
second-order agnosticism, we should consider what the consequences
would be if some hypothesis were worthy. So, if for no other reason,
we should still be motivated to figure out what second-order agnos-
ticism entails.
From here on, I will continue to use ‘h’ as a stand-in for some
hypothesis about which second-order agnosticism is justified. Those
who think there is some such hypothesis should understand ‘h’ accord-
ingly, and those who think there is no such hypothesis can use ‘h’
hypothetically, in order to investigate the significance of their view.
IV. FIRST ANSWER: AGNOSTIC BELIEF GOES
AGAINST RATIONAL REQUIREMENT TO
WITHHOLD JUDGEMENT
One might think that agnostic belief is irrational because the only
justified first-order attitude to have in the absence of evidence is
19 See Gleiser (2015) for a survey.
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withholding belief, or not believing either way. In that case, agnostic
belief is unjustified in the same way that any belief held in the absence
of evidence is unjustified. Here it will be helpful to assume, for the
sake of argument, that second-order agnosticism is not only justified
but also true in this case. This will simplify the discussion by elimin-
ating the need to address whether, if one has a false belief in second-
order agnosticism about h, one’s belief that h is still unjustified.20 So,
let us consider the following claim: granted that a subject correctly
believes second-order agnosticism about h, believing that h (or not-h)
is unjustified, and that explains what is wrong with agnostic belief
that h.
I have three independent objections to this claim. The first two
concern the claim that belief that h is in this case unjustified: (a) this is
not always so obviously plausible; and, (b), if it is true it is insignifi-
cant. My third objection is that: (c) even if it were true and significant
that believing h is unjustified, this does not adequately explain what is
wrong with agnostic belief.
(a) Is Agnostic Belief Really Unjustified?
How plausible is it that, given that one’s second-order agnosticism
about h is correct, one’s belief that h is unjustified? Many, perhaps
most, epistemologists are foundationalists. According to some ver-
sions of that view, some beliefs are justified even though they are not
justified by any evidence or by any further justified belief. Those are
the foundational or ‘basic’ beliefs. Of course there are many different
versions of this view, and this is usually offered as a solution to some
sceptical problem. But the point is that many epistemologists are
already committed to the idea that at least some beliefs are justified
but not by any evidence. Without the further stipulation that they are
mistaken, or that h cannot be one of these basic, justified beliefs, it
does not follow from second-order agnosticism about h that h is
unjustified.21
The observation that, at least according to some theories, evidence
is not necessary for justification leaves open the possibility that
20 See Horowitz (2014) on higher-order defeat.
21 In Avnur (2012a), I argue that justification without evidence is a problematic
notion. I have also rejected the seeming analogy between anti-sceptical beliefs and
religious beliefs, even granting that they both lack evidence (2012b).
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agnostic belief that h is justified. Since my aim is merely to argue that
the claim that h is unjustified does not itself explain what is wrong
with agnostic belief, we can set aside whether such other theories are
true.22 As long as we lack decisive objections against all versions of
foundationalism that could apply to h, we have no decisive reason to
regard h as unjustified.
(b) Would It Matter That H Is Unjustified?
Set aside the reservations expressed above and grant, for the sake of
argument, that agnostic belief that h is unjustified. How exactly would
this explain what is wrong with believing h? The answer might
initially seem obvious: it is wrong because it is unjustified. However,
there are different ways for a belief to lack justification. One way is for
one’s total evidence to tell against h, or for it to make h relatively
unlikely. Given our definition of second-order agnosticism, this is not
the case with h. Rather, in the case of h, evidence does not bear at all
on the likely truth of h. There is no way, on the basis of consulting my
current and foreseeable sources of evidence, to give a non-arbitrary
verdict on the likelihood of h. So if belief that h is unjustified, it is not
unjustified because of some verdict on its probability. Rather, it is
unjustified because no probability assignment can be justified by my
evidence in general (at least from any foreseeable source).
This is important because there is a difference between a belief ’s
being unjustified and a belief ’s being in some sense forbidden by
evidential considerations. If the total evidence tells against the truth of
h, then believing h goes against the evidence, and can be said to be
forbidden by evidential considerations. But if my sources of evidence
are totally silent on whether h is true, is belief that h also forbidden? It
is forbidden only given some additional principle, to the effect that it
is always forbidden to believe something unless the evidence tells in
favour of it. We are currently granting that belief that h is unjustified,
so we are in effect granting some such principle. But, even given the
principle’s truth, it should be noted that when a belief ’s status as
unjustified depends solely on some a priori principle of justification,
the status should be taken with a grain of salt, for two reasons.
22 For example, Plantinga (2000).
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First, there is the familiar Jamesian point that the aim of avoiding
error is not intrinsically worthier than the aim of attaining (interest-
ing) true beliefs. If evidence is silent on h, then the question whether it
is wrong to believe h comes down to which of the two Jamesian aims
is more valuable. Another way to see this is that one can be commit-
ted to accuracy, and thereby follow the evidence where it leads when it
leads somewhere, and still endorse the policy of believing when
evidence is entirely silent. By taking on the belief that h, one does
not compromise one’s accuracy at all, since there is no reason (or
evidence) to think that h is less likely than not. The idea that we
should be on guard against error more than we should be adventur-
ous in our believing is a popular one among philosophers, to be sure.
The Jamesian point is that this is not itself a position that is based on
evidential considerations. Since I am granting that belief that h is
unjustified, I must draw a slightly different lesson from this Jamesian
idea: believing h may be unjustified, but this is merely because we are
prejudiced against error, because we take on some a priori principle
that biases us towards non-belief, instead of favouring potential true
beliefs—and it is certainly not because believing that h goes against
any specific evidence or the total evidence. Given this fact about the
unjustifiedness of h, and given that one’s primary consideration is
accuracy rather than some particular version of accuracy (such as
primarily avoiding error), one should not mind so much if, in this
case, one’s belief is unjustified. It merely counts as unjustified because
of the way we (according to what we are presently granting) count
justification, not because accuracy or evidence itself tells against
believing.
A second way to see the insignificance of being unjustified in
believing h is to consider some alternative notions of justification.
We are currently assuming that believing h is unjustified. But suppose
we invent a new notion, justification2. Justification2 is just like justi-
fication, and gives all the same verdicts in all the same evidential
situations as justification does, except when evidence is silent on a
proposition, in the way it is when second-order agnosticism is true of
it. In such cases, while we are granting that believing is unjustified, we
can stipulate that believing is not unjustified2, and it is also not
justified2. Instead, justification2 is entirely silent on whether to
believe. We can say that believing is a-justified2, rather than unjusti-
fied2. So, the only difference between justification and justification2 is
that, when evidence is silent about a proposition, justification forbids
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belief while justification2 says nothing about belief (or non-belief, or
disbelief). Now consider the question why we should care more about
justification than justification2.
Justification and Justificaiton2 tell us the same exact thing when-
ever second-order agnosticism is false about a proposition, so in all
ordinary cases, there is no difference between the two concepts. The
only difference is that, when evidence is silent on an issue, justifica-
tion2 has nothing to tell us. It ‘permits’ belief only in the sense that it
does not forbid it—similarly, one might say that it is morally ‘per-
missible’ to wiggle your toes right now, not because morality supports
it, but because morality does not say anything at all about it. This is
not, then, a substantive verdict on whether to believe. Justification2 is
simply silent when the evidence is silent. If we are concerned solely
with truth and accuracy in belief, there does not seem to be any
reason to prefer justification to justification2; there is no accuracy-
relevant advantage to following the rules of justification, rather than
of justification2. Therefore, given that our concern is solely with truth
and accuracy, it does not matter that believing h is unjustified, given
that it is also a-justified2. In other words, when the two concepts
diverge, there is no good, epistemic reason to go along with justifica-
tion rather than justification2. One way to understand this is along
Jamesian lines: the aspect or principle of justification that forbids
belief in the case of h does not itself derive from the values of truth or
accuracy. Rather, it derives from a preference for avoiding error over
believing adventurously. It is, in that sense, arbitrary with respect to
accuracy.
If what I have just argued is correct, then even if we grant that
agnostic belief is unjustified, this should not matter much. The lack of
justification, or even the forbiddenness of belief that h according to
our notion of justification, would not explain why it is really, mean-
ingfully wrong to hold an agnostic belief. For, the only thing wrong
with agnostic belief, on the current proposal, is that it happens to be
unjustified, given the notion of justification that we happen to
employ. But we could have employed a different notion of justifica-
tion that did not have this implication, and which would have been
equally faithful to our valuing truth and accuracy in belief.
Objection: epistemic justification, and rationality, cannot possibly
be arbitrary in this way. It is impossible for something to be arbitrarily
justified or unjustified, from the perspective of accuracy, because
justification is precisely the notion we use to track accuracy (from a
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given subject’s perspective). So, something must be wrong with the
argument above.
Reply: We have a choice here. If we accept this objection, we should
take it as an objection also to the assumption that it is unjustified, or
irrational, to believe h in this case. If so, then its being unjustified to
believe h does not explain what is wrong with believing h, since the
belief is not unjustified. That is, the objector must take the argument
about rationality2 as a reductio of our opening assumption that belief
that h is unjustified. But we need not take a stand on whether the
objector is right. The argument presented here leaves us at least with
this disjunction: either belief that h is not unjustified, or else it is
unjustified only because we happen to appeal to justification rather
than justification2, and this is an arbitrary decision. The objection
eliminates the second disjunct. But, regardless of whether it succeeds,
we cannot explain what is wrong with believing h by appealing to the
claim that it is unjustified (for, according to the objection, it is not
unjustified, and otherwise it is merely arbitrarily unjustified).
(c) What Does Agnosticism Have to Do with It?
My first point, (a), was to cast some doubt on the idea that agnostic
belief is always unjustified. My second point, (b), was that even if it is
unjustified, this is not a significant fact about agnostic belief, given the
source or basis of its being unjustified. My third point is entirely
independent of the first two, and it can appeal even to those who
think that (a) and (b) are entirely wrong-headed. Our sense that there
is something wrong with agnostic belief that h is not merely the sense
that belief that h is unjustified. There are many ways for a belief to be
unjustified even in the absence of a further, higher-order belief about
it. Surely, at least part of what is wrong with agnostic belief that h is
the combination of believing both that there is no evidence for h and
that h is true. The second-order belief surely has something to do with
what is wrong here. But the claim that the belief that h is unjustified
does not imply anything about there even being a second-order belief.
In other words, insofar as we think that possessing the second-order
belief—being an agnostic—is significant to what the agnostic believer
is doing wrong, the suggestion that belief that h is unjustified does not
satisfactorily explain what is wrong. The distinctive problem with
agnostic belief has not yet been identified.
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V. SECOND ANSWER: AGNOSTIC BELIEF
IS AN AKRATIC STATE
The phenomenon of akrasia is familiar in the practical sphere: it is,
very roughly, when you do what you think you should not do.
Philosophers have realized that there is a doxastic analogue: when
you believe what you think you should not believe. Is this what the
agnostic believer does, and is it always irrational?
The crucial question here is what, exactly, are the two conflicting
states that the agnostic believer is purportedly in? One of them is
belief that h. But what is the further state that clashes with this belief
in a manifestly irrational or incoherent way? As we saw above, even
assuming second-order agnosticism is correct about h, and that the
subject believes second-order agnosticism about h, it is not obvious
exactly what the subject should think about the status of h. Given the
considerations offered in section IV(a) and (b), we cannot simply
assume that the agnostic thinks that one should not, all things
considered, believe h. For, in the first place, it is not obvious that
second-order agnosticism entails that belief that h is unjustified, and,
in the second place, even if it did entail that believing h is unjustified,
this seems an arbitrary verdict from the perspective of accuracy. The
only uncontroversial verdict about belief that h is that it is not
justified on the basis of evidence, or that it is not the case that you
should believe h. We cannot assume that every agnostic believer
believes much more than that about the status of belief that h.
In light of the fact that the most we can say on behalf of the
agnostic is that believing h is not justified, the following pairs of states
are the most straightforward candidates for akratic description of the
agnostic believer (in first person, in order to display the potential
incoherence):
(1) Believing that I am not epistemically justified in believing p,
and believing p
(2) Not believing that I am epistemically justified in believing p,
and believing p
These are situations in which one believes without justification, not
against it. Consider a practical analogy. Suppose that I have no
justification—and, let us specify, this is because there is no reason—
to wiggle my toes right now. Suppose that I wiggle my toes. Is this
akratic or incoherent? Presumably not. For, it is not the case, right
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now, that there is some reason to refrain from wiggling my toes (or at
least I do not believe there is). So the bare fact that I do something
while thinking that there is no justification to do it, as in (1), or failing
to think that there is justification to do it, as in (2), is not enough to
make me incoherent, or irrationally akratic.
In order for a higher-order state to clash with a belief in an akratic
way, the higher-order state must weigh against, or negatively assess,
the belief. But, since evidence is silent on h (in a way, recall, that does
not support even a 50/50 assessment of h’s chances) it is impossible
that such a higher-order state is justified in this case. Or, more
precisely, if it is justified, it is only arbitrarily, and so not importantly,
justified. A straightforwardly akratic, or internally incoherent, state is
not entailed by agnostic belief, at least not without further contro-
versy, given the discussion in section IV(a) and (b).
One might suspect that too much here rests on my previous
objections, in section IV, to the view that belief that h is unjustified
or forbidden. My objections were admittedly not meant to be con-
clusive. Rather, they purported to show that it is not clear whether
belief that h is forbidden, and that if it is forbidden, it is only
arbitrarily so. An agnostic believer might be convinced by my argu-
ments, and so fail to believe that her own belief is significantly
forbidden. So she might not be akratic. Still, one might think that it
is also not clear whether agnostic belief should entail akrasia. A more
explicit illustration of the combination of attitudes at issue here, and
an assessment of the combination in light of considerations of accur-
acy, will be helpful.
Goldman has usefully distinguished ‘ex ante’ justification from ‘ex
poste’ justification.23 One has ex poste justification when one’s belief
is itself supported by evidence. One is ex ante justified in believing p
when p is the right thing for her, the subject, to believe. Whether one
has ex ante justification, then, depends on the rest of the believer’s
states and beliefs. The idea that akrasia is irrational, and that therefore
the agnostic believer is irrational, is a matter of irrationality ex ante,
presumably. For it is in virtue of holding the combination of beliefs,
not some single belief type considered in isolation, that the subject is
said to be akratic. The view currently being considered is presumably
that the agnostic lacks ex ante justification because the agnostic
23 Goldman (1979), p. 21.
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believes that her belief that h lacks evidential support, so presumably
belief that h is not the right thing for her to believe. But now notice
that this ex ante irrationality, at least in this case, is not epistemic, or
related to accuracy. For, all the agnostic believer has done to deserve
to be called irrational is add the belief that h. And, by stipulation, the
agnostic can have no indication whatsoever that h is likely to be false.
So the agnostic went from rational to irrational by adding a belief
which does not affect her overall accuracy from her evidential per-
spective. So the akrasia involved here is not epistemically irrational, or
irrational from the perspective of truth and accuracy. It is perhaps not
an ideally coherent state to be in, but that would not explain why
being an agnostic believer is epistemically wrong.
The point can be summarized as follows. Consider a system of
beliefs that is coherent and includes the belief in second-order agnos-
ticism about h. Adding the belief that h is true (or the belief that h is
false) does not make this system incoherent. If it degrades the system,
it does not do so epistemically, since relative to, or internal to, the
system there is no believed indication that believing h decreases
accuracy. There is no epistemic inconstancy in such a system since
belief that h need not be forbidden according to the system, even if it
is not supported or justified by the system.
One final note about knowledge will be helpful here. Some philo-
sophers24 have suggested that believing something commits one to
having knowledge of it, or that knowledge is the norm of belief. The
second-order agnostic holds that p is unknowable, so, according to
the knowledge norm of belief, agnostic belief is irrational.25 Inter-
preted as a view about epistemic rationality of belief, the knowledge
norm seems implausible, as others have argued.26 Though I lack space
to discuss the debate at length here, one can appreciate the initial
difficulty for the knowledge norm of belief by considering simple,
justified, false beliefs. False justified beliefs are not knowledge, but
they are still justified beliefs. For example, I could have very good
evidence that my wife is a Catholic, but it could turn out that she is
not. Perhaps she has been carefully hiding her true religion from me
for years. If that happens, I was still justified, by all that evidence, in
24 For example, Williamson (2000); Owens (2000); and Huemer (2007).
25 Thanks to Paul Hovda for bringing the knowledge norm to my attention in this
connection.
26 For example, Littlejohn (2010) and Hawthorne, Rothchild, and Spectre (2016).
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believing she was Catholic. Given all the evidence I had, it seems it
would have been irrational, from an epistemic point of view, not to
believe that she is Catholic! So, although I did not know she is
Catholic, it was rational for me to believe that she is Catholic. The
knowledge norm seems, prima facie, false. Note also that similar
views about assertion,27 though more plausible, are irrelevant to
belief, in the absence of further argument. I discuss the relation
between asserting and believing in section VI, in connection with
Moore’s paradox.
VI. THIRD ANSWER: AGNOSTIC BELIEF COMMITS
ONE TO A MOORE-PARADOXICAL JUDGEMENT
Agnostic belief may still seem to involve some sort of inconsistency,
because it entails a recognition that evidence fails to support what one
believes. In section IV((a) and (b)) I suggested that this absence of
evidential support for one’s belief—that is, the second-order agnosti-
cism about h—does not necessarily make believing significantly
unjustified. And, in section V, I argued that having both agnostic
and believing attitudes is not necessarily epistemically irrational. But
if one has both attitudes, and one is conscious of this, then one is in a
position to judge that one is in both attitudes. This judgement can be
performed to oneself or to others, in the form of an assertion,
affirming that one does not endorse (or think there is evidence for)
a belief that one has. The idea considered in this section is that this
self-conscious judgement leads, in two steps, to an explanation of
what is wrong with agnostic belief. The first step is to claim that this
judgement, to the effect that one holds both agnosticism and belief
about the same hypothesis, is odd or, worse, absurd. The second step
is to claim that the absurdity of judging that you are an agnostic
believer shows that there is something wrong with being an agnostic
believer.
However, both steps are independently problematic, and both
would need to be correct in order for this approach to succeed.
27 For example, Unger (1984); Williamson (2000); and Lackey (2007).
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I will frame this discussion in terms of so-called ‘Moore-paradoxical
sentences’.
(a) Is a Moore-paradoxical Sentence Produced
by Agnostic Belief Absurd?
Moore-paradoxical sentences are conjunctions that clearly could be
true and yet it is absurd, perhaps incoherent, for someone to assert or
judge them to be true.28 So perhaps one way to bring out what seems
irrational about agnostic belief is to put the two elements, the agnos-
ticism and the belief, together into a conjunction of the sort that gives
rise to Moore’s paradox. In what follows I use the term ‘judge’ to
mean ‘either assert to others or think to oneself ’. To take the standard
example, it could be true about someone, S, that
It is raining and S does not believe that it is raining
But it is absurd for S to judge
It is raining and I do not believe that it is raining.
The puzzle is to explain why the second conjunction is absurd, given
that, as we just saw, it could be true. I will not summarize the vast
literature on this here. But it is possible to determine whether this will
settle our question by considering some initial rough ideas about the
paradox. It is tempting to say that the first-person judgement above
seems absurd because, in the first conjunct, S seems to express or
imply (among other things) that S believes that it is raining; and the
second conjunct specifies that S does not believe that it is raining. That
is one solution to this version of Moore’s paradox, if it correctly
explains what is wrong with judging the conjunction.
In order to gain insight into agnostic belief, we need to consider
other, epistemic variations of the paradox, in which an assertion is
conjoined with an epistemically relevant claim.29 For example,
It is raining and S does not know that it is raining
might well be true, but
It is raining and I do not know that it is raining
28 See Coliva (2015) for a recent discussion of Moore’s paradox.
29 See Huemer (2007) for discussion of epistemic versions of Moore’s paradox.
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seems very odd. One natural explanation for this is that, if you do not
know that it is raining, you should not assert that it is raining in the
first conjunct. But, is the agnostic believer committed to any such,
absurd judgement? I think not.
The agnostic believer’s agnosticism implies that she does not know
whether h is true. So she presumably is willing to judge that she does
not know that h. This matches the second conjunct above (‘I do not
know that it is raining’). But what about the first conjunct? The
agnostic believer is not necessarily an agnostic asserter, to others or
to herself in thought. That is, it is consistent with being an agnostic
believer that one also does not, and should not, make an unqualified
judgement that h.
What is the relation between believing h and being willing to judge,
without qualification, that h? It is often noted that, when one asserts
something, one is expressing belief in that thing. That is, according to
one standard theory of language, one of the main functions of
assertion is to communicate beliefs. But it does not follow that one
should be willing to assert anything that one believes. And, clearly,
asserting ‘h’ does not merely or only express a belief that h. It does
other things too. For example, according to the knowledge norm of
assertion, it expresses a commitment to knowing that p.30 That is a
good explanation of why ‘p and I do not know that p’ sounds so odd.
It could be this other stuff that an assertion that h expresses, not the
mere belief in h, that clashes with the second conjunct, ‘I do not know
that h’. If so, then the mere belief in h does not clash with the
judgement that one does not know that h.
To appreciate this point, notice that there is more than one way to
communicate, or to judge, that one believes something besides assert-
ing it. One can say, or say to oneself, that one believes it.31 One can
say ‘I believe that p’ with the aim of communicating that one believes
that p. (That is not to say that this is the only thing one can
communicate with ‘I believe p’.) And notice that
I believe that p but I do not know that p
30 See Unger (1984) and Williamson (2000).
31 See Moran (2001), pp. 100–7, on this point; and Chislenko (2014) for some
discussion.
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does not sound so bad. In fact, however that conjunction initially
strikes you, you should not, on reflection, think it is absurd. Consider
the fact that the following sounds absurd:
I know that p but maybe p is false
However, this assertion does not sound absurd:
I believe that p but I might be wrong about that
and nor does this assertion:
I believe that p but maybe p is false
If ‘I believe that p’ does not clash with ‘I might be wrong about that’,
then ‘I believe that p’ cannot commit you to ‘I know that p’, since that
does clash with ‘I might be wrong about that’. Therefore, ‘I believe
that p and I do not know that p’ must not be Moore-paradoxical, at
least not in virtue of the states that the two conjuncts directly describe
(namely, agnostic belief). So whatever explains the oddity of
P and I do not know that p
it is not that believing that p commits you to knowing that p.32
Some33 hold that there is a sort of belief, ‘outright’ or ‘categorical’
belief, which commits you to practical certainty. Briefly, they think
that when you categorically believe something, this ends the inquiry
into it, and the possibility that it is false is off the table (absent new,
further evidence that dislodges your categorical belief). You can
therefore appropriately assert it, without qualification, in your own
thinking and to others. So if the agnostic believer categorically believes
h, then it seems she is indeed committed to the judgement ‘h and I do
not know that h’, which we are granting is an absurd judgement.
However, I doubt that what we usually mean, in ordinary English,
by ‘believe’ is categorical belief, so I am inclined to treat this view with
a huge grain of salt. Even Huemer acknowledges, for example, that ‘I
believe that p, but p might be false’ does not sound problematic, or at
any rate is not Moore-paradoxical.34 His explanation is that, when we
32 See Hawthorne, Rothchild, and Spectre (2016) for discussion of similar sorts of
Moore sentences, also leading to the conclusion that the norm for assertion is
stronger, or more demanding, than the norm for belief.
33 For example, Owens (2000) and Huemer (2007).
34 Huemer (2007), p. 153.
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describe ourselves as believing something is this case, we have in
mind a non-categorical belief; we have partial belief in mind, or a
belief that consists in having a high enough degree of confidence.
Even ignoring the question of what the ordinary English ‘believe’
means, we can set aside categorical belief. For our purposes, it would be
interesting enough if the following state turned out to be not irrational:
having a high degree of confidence in h while thinking that h is
unknowable because there is no evidence for it (in the sense that
second-order agnosticism is true about it). This is not a ‘retreat’ to a
less interesting view than was originally advertised. For one, merely
being confident in h, or thinking that h is probably true, does what we
usually take beliefs to do. It can explain someone’s actions, for example:
he climbed the tree because he was pretty confident that there was gold
in the bird’s nest. Categorical belief is not required for explaining
behaviour in the way that beliefs as we usually think about them do.
Second, most other beliefs are just like the non-categorical agnostic
belief with respect to our unwillingness to unqualifiedly assert their
content. For example, when I am discussing with someone why
I believe, or the reasons for believing, that the climate is changing,
I am not going to just assert, without qualification, that it is changing,
even though I do believe that the climate is changing. Similarly,
I believe that I will not die completely broke. But given that I think
there is some small chance that I will die broke, I will not just use the
premise that I will not die broke when thinking about my children’s
future. Instead, I am going to use the premise that most likely I will not
die broke, or maybe that I will not die broke with the qualification that
I am assuming the worst-case scenario will not happen.
To sum up, I grant for the sake of argument that the epistemic
Moore sentence, of the form ‘p and I do not know that p’, is an absurd
judgement. But these conjuncts can be taken to express only agnostic
categorical belief. This leaves open whether agnostic non-categorical
belief is always irrational, and this is arguably the belief state we have
had in mind all along, and at any rate deserves our attention.
(b) Would the Absurdity of Judging the Conjunction
Show What is Wrong with Agnostic Belief?
There is another, more general point to make here, independent of the
details of Moore’s paradox. Recall that the second step was to infer,
72 Agnosticism
from the apparent absurdity of judging the relevant conjunction, that
there is something wrong with having the attitudes that the conjunc-
tion describes. This is a dubious inference, regardless of whether the
judgement describing agnostic belief is absurd. My objection to this
second step is more decisive than my objection to the first, because the
objection to the first step involved consideration of some specific
conjunctions and our intuitions about them. The specifics are debat-
able, intuitions can be pumped in different directions, and in any case
perhaps new, clever conjunctions that the agnostic believer is commit-
ted to can be found. For example, consider some conjunctions that
more directly describe the agnostic believer’s situation:
I believe h and I lack evidence for it
Probably h, and there is no reason to think that h.
Perhaps to some people these sound odd. What follows from this
about non-categorical agnostic belief? Not much, I will now argue,
because such simple conjunctions do not specify enough about the
agnostic believer’s state.
Consider an analogy. I judge: ‘I could not have done otherwise, but
it was up to me whether to raise my hand’. This judgement seems very
odd, and even inconsistent. How could it have been up to me if
I could not have done otherwise? If we leave it at that, we suspect
that the statement expresses an irrational couple of beliefs. However,
suppose that we do not leave it at that and further specify that I am a
compatibilist philosopher. I believe a whole, further theory that also
addresses opposing intuitions about the relevant concepts and
explains why the conjunction sounds odd. Without filling in the
relevant compatibilist theory of what ‘up to me’ means, we would
not expect someone to hear the conjunction as something normal, or
even coherent. In fact, that is what the philosophical theory of
compatibilism is supposed to do: make sense of apparently conflicting
claims. Furthermore, the compatibilist thinks that rejecting the pos-
sibility that the two conjuncts are compatible leads one into deeper
philosophical trouble, and perhaps it leads one into endorsing an
even more absurd-sounding conjunction.
So, we should not take the fact that the isolated conjunction sounds
odd, in conversation or in thought, as a good indication of whether
compatibilism is a rational theory to hold. In general: when evaluat-
ing a position, we should not just pick two sentences from it and
conjoin them to see how it sounds. We should consider the entire
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position or theory, especially when the rest of the theory contains an
explanation of why the two conjuncts may sound odd together even
though they are both true.
Plausibly, this fits the case of the agnostic believer, or the view that
agnostic belief is not always irrational. Agnostic belief may, and
perhaps should, be accompanied by the claim that no attitude about
p whatsoever is non-arbitrarily justified, since evidence does not bear
on the issue at all, or it is outside the scope of epistemic standards. So,
rather than consider just the conjunction, ‘I believe h and there is no
evidence for h’, we should consider:
I believe h and evidence is silent on h, so I have no reason to have
any attitude whatsoever about it; h is the sort of proposition that is
outside the scope of non-arbitrary epistemic reasons; from the
perspective of accuracy, no attitude is more justified than any
other about h, but nor is any attitude forbidden . . .
Consider also that our practice of evaluating beliefs, and particularly
evaluating them for support by evidence and overall coherence, usually
takes place in everyday contexts in which evidence is at play and on the
table. That is, evidence bears on the vast majority of beliefs that we
usually evaluate. But agnostic belief is, explicitly, different. So, we should
expect that our kneejerk reactions to the mere fact that one is agnostic
and also believes are not as accurate as our careful consideration of the
entire situation. In other words, we should reflect, reason, and do
philosophy in order to figure out what is wrong, if anything, with
agnostic belief when it is accompanied by an epistemological theory.
VII . CONCLUSION: WITH RESERVATIONS
AND CONCESSIONS, AGNOSTIC BELIEF NEED
NOT BE IRRATIONAL
The question I set out to answer is: What is wrong with agnostic
belief, from the epistemic perspective of accuracy? I considered what
I take to be the three main ways to answer it by showing that it is
always irrational to be an agnostic believer. But none of those answers
succeeded, so I do not think they can explain what is wrong with
agnostic belief. It seems, then, that agnostic belief might be defensible
after all. This does not imply, of course, that all agnostic beliefs are
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defensible. My aim in this section is to consider what features a
defensible agnostic belief must have. To do this, I discuss the conces-
sions made above in defending agnostic belief from the various
challenges posed by the three attempted answers, as well as some
additional issues that arise about agnostic belief.
(a) On the Partial, or Non-categorical Nature
of the Agnostic’s Belief
In order to defend agnostic belief against the various arguments
considered above, I have suggested that it cannot involve a categorical
belief. The content, h, cannot be used in an unqualified way in one’s
reasoning or plainly asserted in communication in all contexts. It is,
in other words, not anything like a certainty for the believer. Instead,
agnostic belief in h should be a state of confidence in h, where one
‘thinks’ that h, or perhaps one is pretty sure, but not certain, that h.
The agnostic believer expects, to some degree, that h is true, but not
unreservedly or unqualifiedly.
What, then, can the agnostic believer assert, to herself in thinking
or others in communication, if not the content of her belief, h? As a
believer, the agnostic believer does not hold merely that it might be
that h is true; she should be willing to assert more than just ‘maybe h’.
A more confident agnostic believer could assert ‘I think that h’, ‘I am
pretty sure that h’, or even ‘probably h’. But a more conservative
agnostic believer should stick with more reserved expressions such as
‘it may well be that h’. In all of these cases, the possibility of h has not
been foreclosed and is thought to be more plausible than not-h.
Another noteworthy aspect of agnostic belief ’s non-categorical
nature is that it may still feel categorical, or practically certain, to
the subject. Agnostic belief may feel like a practical certainty because
inquiry into h is closed, and this is a central characteristic of categor-
ical belief as Owens and Huemer characterize it. But in the case of h,
inquiry and evidence are off the table by default, because there can be
no such evidence according to her agnosticism. In other words, the
case is closed because of the content of the belief (or the nature of the
hypothesis), not because of the attitude that the subject has towards
the content. So while it may feel like some sort of practical certainty,
defensible agnostic belief in h is not categorical belief, since it is held
in conjunction with recognition that h may be false.
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That agnostic belief involves the closure of investigation, and thus
feels like categorical belief, distinguishes it from some other states that
one may have associated with agnosticism. For instance, Friedman35
has recently offered both a compelling case against reducing agnos-
ticism to a degree of confidence—which is completely independent of
any of the considerations I have offered—and a positive suggestion
about what attitude agnosticism consists in. Her positive suggestion is
that being agnostic is, roughly, keeping an inquiry open. To be
agnostic is to consider it unsettled whether h, and therefore to
continue to inquire about it. However, I doubt that openness, or
inquiry, are necessary ingredients in agnosticism. I have described a
type of agnosticism in which the agnostic takes there to be no
foreseeable way to get evidence about h, so further inquiry would be
futile. Inquiry, at least in the sense of consulting one’s sources of
evidence, into h is closed for my agnostic. So even if we take con-
tinuing an inquiry about something to be an available doxastic state
in general, this state does not seem to be justified by, let alone an
essential part of, agnosticism.
Perhaps other facts about one’s situation, over and above the facts
that justify second-order agnosticism, make it reasonable to open
some other sort of inquiry. For example, if you think that no
known sources of evidence are available only because our concepts
are underdeveloped here, then you may attempt a conceptual shift.
That is a sort of inquiry. But notice two things: first, this is not
essential to the sort of agnosticism I described, rather it is something
that could happen in some such cases. Second, this is not a straight-
forward search for evidence. It is, in effect, a search for new kinds of
evidence, or a new kind of question to investigate (since the concepts
expressed in the question are being changed).
(b) What Else Should the Agnostic Believer
Believe and Do?
The agnostic believer should hold some further attitudes about the
status of her beliefs, aside frommerely that the belief is not justified by
evidence. The agnostic believer should think that epistemic norms, or
35 Friedman (2013).
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rationality, have nothing non-arbitrary to say about whether to
believe h. If instead one regards the lack of evidence for h as a good,
significant reason to withhold belief in h (say, because one is not one
of James’ adventurous types), then it would indeed seem incoherent,
or inconsistent, for one to go on and believe h anyway. The agnostic
believer need not regard her belief in h as positively justified, but she
should certainly not regard her own belief in h as forbidden, or a bad
thing to believe from an epistemic perspective. In other words, the
agnostic believer must regard the significance of her lack of evidence
for h as no indication at all about what to think about h.
As I noted above, non-categorical belief presumably explains and
causes actions. Is there anything distinctive about the way agnostic
belief explains and causes actions, or should? Given that the agnostic
believer holds that evidence does not support her belief, it seems right
for her to exercise caution and humility when acting on her belief,
especially when the action affects others’ well-being. And, when
expressing her belief in h, it seems she should specify (if the context
is appropriate) that the evidence does not support it.
How can an agnostic believer take her belief seriously as a premise
in her own thinking, given that she aims at accuracy and she knows
that there is no indication that h is true? This has been addressed
above to some extent, when I suggested that she should not use the
premise that h in her reasoning (or in thinking to herself) without
qualification in every context. Her thinking to herself that h, when she
is in the process of reasoning to some other, descriptive or factual
conclusion, should be framed, either explicitly or in the way it is used
in the context, under the proviso that she has no reliable indication
that h is true. This should insulate her from concluding anything
much about the world on the basis of h, with any confidence, solely
on the basis of h. In other words, her confidence that h is true is
entirely epistemologically detached from her other beliefs about the
world, cut off from her inferences about the here and now. This is not
an overly restrictive constraint, because, by hypothesis, the content of
her belief, h, has no relevant informational connection to things about
which we can get evidence, or else it is not a candidate for second-
order agnosticism (see section I). So it is not clear how an inference
could take one from h to conclusions that can ever be verified anyway.
This leaves open, however, that the agnostic believer’s confidence in h
stimulates non-doxastic states such as wondering about h, and per-
haps some affective attitudes arising from whatever the details of h
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are. Perhaps some things are reasonable to hope for only given h, so
those hopes are enabled by agnostic belief.
If two agnostics disagree about whether h is true—that is, one of
them is an agnostic believer and the other is an agnostic non-belie-
ver—what is the upshot of the disagreement? What do they learn
from each other in their disagreement? It seems that neither of them
learns about the probability of h, since both think that evidence for h
is absent. Rather, each one learns something about the other’s dox-
astic policies or inclinations. The non-believer, for example, learns
that the believer is an adventurous type when it comes to such topics,
and this may be valuable information about a member of one’s
epistemic community. It seems important, then, for the agnostic
believer to present her belief as it is, unsupported by evidence, when
engaging in debate.
As for basing decisions that primarily affect one’s own life, it seems
the consequences of agnostic belief can be both intellectually and
emotionally significant. How could acting on h produce some signifi-
cant and noticeable effect, given how removed h must be from the
problems and issues encountered in this world? H, after all, cannot be
indicated or implicated in any way by anything one experiences or
foresees experiencing, or else it is not a candidate for justified second-
order agnosticism (see section I). But the agnostic believer may well
spend more time wondering, for example, what the transcendent
realm is like, or how this affects the significance of her current life.
Perhaps this results in new affective attitudes towards this life that she
would otherwise lack. To see this, consider one last example.
Consider an ‘h’ that concerns a transcendent reality in which we
somehow live on, beyond this life. That you think h might well be the
case would explain your wondering about what this further life might
be like, what the relation between your current life and this further
realm is, and so on. Schellenberg36 has even suggested that certain
forms of ritual are made rational by such ‘wondering’ or imaginative
attitudes befitting an agnostic or ‘sceptic’ (whether or not the agnostic
believes). It seems to me that these activities are not philosophically
trivial. Even if such reflections and attitudes turn out to be a-rational,
or outside the scope of the sorts of reasons and evidence that this life
36 Schellenberg (2009).
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provides, they are the sort of reflection that an agnostic believer can
engage in without any incoherence or blatant irrationality.
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